Appendix to the Epilogue to... 'The Relativity of Community - Constituent Behaviors'
1. No-one denies that there are mechanical (non-electrical) inductive forces at work in the world that are beyond the capacity of descriptions based on the actions of 'independent' material agents. Newton openly conceded this in the intro to his 'Principia'.
2. Scientists agree that there is ambiguity between the 'position' and 'motion' of an 'independent material agent'.
3. Relativity suggests that this ambiguity relates to the fact that the dynamics of the material agent are, in fact, interdependent with the enveloping environmental dynamic, and that as the constituent moves relative to his enveloping others, the inductive influence on him is simultaneously transforming. In general relativity theory, there is only a space-time energy distribution that is continually transforming (the matter is included by its energy equivalent) thus there is nothing 'to be pushed around by forces' but the picture is a purely inductive picture (i.e. a force cannot act on 'something' if the formulation has no 'somethings', ... and a 'thing' cannot assert kinetically, if there are no 'things' in the formulation).
4. While Poincaré would argue that there can be no absolute certainty on our part as to the nature of motion (since we are ourselves interdependently included within it and can only know it 'relatively', by imposing geometric and theoretical conventions on it ('conventionalism'), .... Einstein would say that relativity is a property of the objective world out there (realism).
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What is at stake here, in the difference between these two philosophies, is the different role of the subjective intuition of the individual included observer-participant. that is;
Einstein's relativity -purely objective -'realism'
If relativity is a property of the objective world out there, as it is in 'realism', then what is important is to get to the most accurate view of what is going on in the world out there, ... and this will of course come from those most 'expert' in their scientific perceptions, and thus this leads to a 'hierarchical councils' and top-down controls implementing the best ideas in relation to 'what's going on out there'. since relativity is, at the base of it, about the movement of energy, ... this philosophy underpins the purificationist hierarchical management of an 'energy economy'.
Poincare's relativity - intrinsically subjective - 'conventionalism'
Since there is a basic ambiguity in what is moving relative stems from the fact that the included observer's perceptions are warped by the interdependency between his own movement and the enveloping environmental dynamic, ... the subjectivity of the included participant relative to the world around him plays a key role in co-determining what goes on in the enveloping world dynamic. Thus, the 'consciousness' of the included constituent is a 'real-time' player in the world dynamic. Since we are continuously moving in a relative sense, our consciousness of the enveloping dynamic cannot be separated from 'the dynamic out there'. That is, our consciousness is inseparable from our sense of the enveloping environmental dynamic. As we move relative to the enveloping otherness, so transforms our consciousness and so transforms the enveloping otherness, as in the Zen parable of 'wind, flag and mind'. In this 'conventionalist' philosophy, what is important is NOT trying to determine the most accurate view of what is going on in the world out there (as in einstein's realism) but in co-creating the desired view, and this leads to the evolution of sharing circles and the identification of effective inductive coordination influences (e.g. 'elders' in the native american tradition). Since relativity is, at the base of it, about the movement of energy, .... this philosophy underpins the inclusional nested-resonance management of energy economy (as in the case of the flock of geese).
There is nothing strange about Heisenberg's uncertainty principle and quantum behaviour if one 'lets go' of our 'anthropocentric eyes' or 'self-centric eyes'.
The message in Kepler's and Poincaré's work is that the structure we impose on the world is 'our structure' and not nature's. The planets do not really move in elliptical orbits (and Kepler said this in very clearly in his 'harmonies of the world'). that is, they move in elliptical orbits in our descriptions of convenience. kepler described their actual dynamics in terms of nested cocoon spinners.
So, it is clear from the principle of relativity that one cannot exactly determine both the position and motion of an object at the same time because the position and motion are interdependent in relativity (the dynamic of the constituent references to the enveloping community dynamic it is helping to co-produce).
that is, Heisenberg's principle assumes an imposed rigid frame as the reference for measuring both position and motion while there is no such thing as a rigid frame in nature ,... only a continuously transforming energy distribution (which includes a continuously transforming mass distribution and continuously transforming distribution between kinetic and resonant energy - i.e. resonant energy is stored in a codynamical complex like the solar system or the turbulence enveloping the flock of geese).
We have equipped our anthropocentric eyes which are also ego-centric eyes with lenses that impose a rigid reference frame that does not exist in nature. in nature, everything is moving at the same time under the mutual influence of everything else, and this mutual interaction induces resonances, such as the resonance that is implicit in the solar system and accepted by science (it is described though not explained by science).
So our anthropocentric/egocentric lenses impose this frame on the dynamics we see 'out there' and so we describe the motion of mars etc. with respect to this imposed rigid frame, ... and find that it looks weird because we haven't accounted for the interdependence of our own motion on the motion of the things we are looking out at, ... through the intermediation of resonant systems such as the solar system.
The same thing happens when I play pool; i.e. when I look out through the eyes of a ball at the movements going on 'out there' I impose the fixed frame and see everything in terms of time-based transactions.
But I can also 'let go' of my rigid-frame-imposing lenses and instead accept that my 'real' reference frame is my relative space-time relationship with the dynamical geometry of the enveloping space.
What do i get by doing this? I get the sense of my motion relative to the continuously opening-up and closing-down geometries of opportunity. that is, I get a sense of the game in terms of all of the constituents (balls etc.) at the same time looking for opportunity-to-move and asserting themselves into it.
The rigid-framed transactional view did not inform me as to how the various motions of the constituents interfered (how the constituents interacted) so as to give rise to passageways that opened up and closed down in a way that was interdependent with my own movement.
Obviously, a new consideration presents itself when I let go of my ego-centrism (and anthropocentrism) and that is, that I can find, by varying the way i move relative to enveloping others, more or less harmonious (doing more as a group with less energy) ways of moving relative to the enveloping and continuously transforming opportunity-to-move that my relative motion is helping to co-produce.
This is the lesson the pretzel shaped geo-centric (ego-centric) orbit of mars that was duly noted and documented by kepler in 'harmonies of the world', but it is a lesson that Newton overlooked, and that mainstream science continues to overlook.
More than this, to retain the rigid-frame-imposing time-based transactional view when 'space gets crowded' is a recipe for dissonance since the openings and closings of the corridors of opportunity-to-move, emerging from the relative movements of the dynamical constituency, ... get trickier to navigate by the included participating co-creator of opportunity.
Whether we are referring to planets or cars on the freeway or geese or electrons, ... the relativity principle holds for all.
The sensory enveloping-geometry perceptions of the included navigators of this dynamical complexity (continuously transforming geometry of opportunity-to-move) cannot be perceived 'from the outside' because they are many and they are all transforming at the same time. the collective that achieves community-constituent harmony does so by 'understanding' the interdependencies between their relative movements and their individual opportunity-to-move and thus, in resonance-seeking mode, they 'let themselves move' relative to others in such a manner that their opportunity-to-move is sustained in a smooth energy-exchanging way (without a lot of unnecessary accelerations and decelerations).
Thus we know from experience that we are capable of this 'relativistic' referencing mode that allows a group of us to co-produce 'resonant flow', the dynamic wherein we sustainably open up opportunity-to-move for each other's diversely oriented assertions.
And, from neural feedback studies we know that we can influence our own neural responses in an ordered manner outside of rational thought; e.g. we can change the balance of the 8-11 Hz neural waveband (associates with sensorimotor dynamics) relative to the overall 0-40 Hz neural waveband of the central nervous system. This 'access' to the neuralwaves associated with the management of our physiology (i.e. we can influence our body temperature even though that is normally managed on a sub-aware level) indicates that we can be guided by our senses on a level more fundamental than rational thought with its imposed rigid frames.
Now, since the planets included in the community-of-sun-and-planets can also do this, and also the electrons and protons included in the community-constituent codynamics at the atomic level, ... this 'relativistic navigating faculty' ostensibly available to all the constituents of nature would seem to merit our attention since it concerns the role of 'subjectivity' in the world dynamic.
This 'relativistic navigating faculty' is clearly not the same thing as the scientifically described movements of the constituents of a community.
that is, our neural responses are inductively 'trained' by our entering into a resonant codynamic with our enveloping environmental dynamic as when we are children and are inductively shaped by the enveloping dynamics of our parents and authority figures.
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[Nota Bene neurofeedback is a 'science' that is non-mainstream because it is essentially 'inductive' and doesn't lend itself to analysis by the 'causal' models of mainstream science. But in pyschology it is well known that;
"Children model their behavior primarily on the behavior of their parents and other authority figures. Whether or not this behavior is effective at producing happiness doesn't prevent the child from modeling it; the modeling is not a result of reasoning, but is due to simple observation and imitation. This mimicry is illustrated in the old saying "Like father, like son," or now better put, "Like parent, like child." Whether parents are happy or not doesn't stop a child from imitating what he or she observes; children are like dry sponges ready to absorb the first water they come in contact with."
One can 'see the gap' when one compares this statement to that by Isaac Newton in his 'Author's Preface' to The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy (The Principia)', 1687;
"I wish we could derive the rest of the phaenomena of nature by the same kind of reasoning from physical principles; for I am induced by many reasons to suspect that they all may depend upon certain forces by which the particles of bodies, by some causes hitherto unknown, are either mutually impelled towards each other, and cohere in regular figures, or are repelled and recede from each other; which forces being unknown, philosophers have hitherto attempted the search of nature in vain; but I hope the principles laid down will afford some light either to this or some truer method of philosophy."
That is, the descriptions of natural phenomena coming from the imposition of rigid frames in order to separate space from time and to forcibly describe motion in terms of the time-based actions and transactions of 'independent' material agents, ... precludes inquiry into the natural processes of induction. Nobody doubts that neurofeedback 'works'. I certainly don't as I have done it myself and made it available to friends. What is demonstrates is that our 'sensory faculties' do not have to submit to the authority of our rational function, ... the function that imposes rigid frames on our perceptions. We have always known this. There is a crude saying that captures this;
"A hard cock has no brains"
The following citation from Candace Pert's 'Molecules of Emotion' indicates that human physiology has a 'distributed' sensory system, i.e;
"... I'd like to conclude my presentation with my final slide, that of a single-celled animal, the tetrahymena. This is a creature so widely studied in basic science laboratories that it has earned the title of 'the workhorse of biology". What is truly amazing is that this primitive unicellular animal makes many of the same peptides, including insulin and the endorphins , that we humans do. On its single-cell surface, Blanche O'Neil found opiate receptors just like the ones in our brains. These same basic building blocks are found in the earliest and simplest forms of life as well as in the most complex ones. . . . I like to bring the tetrahymena to your attention because it both illustrates an important biological fact and gives me a chance to end my lecture on a philosophical note. Think about what it means that the same basic informational network found in the tetrahymena is still to be found in us. If these peptides and their receptors --- the molecules of emotion --- have not only been conserved since their origins in the earliest and simplest forms of life but have continued to grow into the incredibly elaborate psychosomatic network we have discovered in the human body, we have to conclude that their role in evolution has been a powerful and critical one. To me, this is a stunning demonstration of the unity of all life. We humans share a common heritage, the molecules of emotion, with the most modest of microscopic creatures, a one-celled being, even though evolution has caused us to develop into trillion-celled creatures of astonishing magnificence. I leave you with that thought, and thank you for your attendance at my lecture today."
Without needing to get into the functioning details, there is clearly plenty of scope for explaining what has already been validated by our experience; i.e. that humans, like the geese and other constituents of nature, are equipped with a 'relativistic navigating faculty' that is outer-inner-induction based. But outer-inner induction that shapes the patterns of assertive behavior as the assertive behaviours are co-shaping it, was not included in Newton's physics and continues to be avoided by modern physics. That is, the preferential interest in physics and in mainstream science is with respect to 'what things do'; i.e. the time-based actions and transactions of 'independent' material agents. Simultaneous outer-inner codynamical interdependence, as is manifest in the complex systems in nature cannot be described in terms of time-based transactions but require space and time to be left 'intact'.]
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Ok, now we're closing in on a question, ... how far did the 'relativity' of Einstein go? It does require spherical space that keeps space-time intact, .. but what about the issue of inclusion? Einstein and Infeld make several comments that come 'close' to touching on this in 'The Evolution of Physics';
"Two expressions for energy occur in the mathematical description, each of which changes, although the sum does not vary. It is thus possible to introduce mathematically and rigorously the concepts of potential energy, depending on position, and kinetic energy, depending on velocity. The introduction of the two names is, of course, arbitrary and justified only by convenience. The sum of the two quantities remains unchanged, and is called a constant of motion. The total energy, kinetic plus potential, is like a substance." The authors go on to observe; "Our world is not euclidian. The geometrical nature of our world is shaped by masses and their velocities." . . . "It [relativity] forces us to analyze the role played by geometry in the description of the physical world."
But what do they mean by Our world is not euclidian?
Do they mean that 'relativity' is a property of the objective world out there? It sounds as if they do.
Poincare is saying that we impose these frames (euclidian and non-euclidian) on the world for our convenience and that our included-in-space experience is very different; i.e. ;
"Space is another framework we impose upon the world" . . . " . . . here the mind may affirm because it lays down its own laws; but let us clearly understand that while these laws are imposed on our science, which otherwise could not exist, they are not imposed on Nature." . . . "Euclidian geometry is . . . the simplest, . . . just as the polynomial of the first degree is simpler than a polynomial of the second degree." . . . "the space revealed to us by our senses is absolutely different from the space of geometry." . . . Henri Poincaré
The issue at stake here is the implication of relativity as concerns our subjectivity. as Kepler noted, our self-centric view was distorted by the manner our interdependent involvement with the dynamics we look out at; i.e. relativity has a subjective aspect to it and cannot all be explained in terms of pure objectivity.
Poincare clearly does not believe in the absolutes of motion as his following statement, cited in his argument contra Newton that rotational motion was relative and included in Enrico Giannetto's paper, makes clear;
"... this affirmation; "the earth turns", makes no sense, for there is no experience that would allow us to verify it; for such an experience, not only would be impossible to realize, not in the most powerful dreams of a Jules Verne, but is unable to even be conceived without contradiction; or rather these two propositions "the earth turns", and "it is more convenient to suppose that the earth turns", have one and the same meaning; there is nothing more in the one than in the other...."
Now we are coming down to the difference in views between einstein and poincare on relativity; i.e. while einstein bundles relativity into the 'behavior of the objective world out there', ... ' Poincaré sees relativity in terms of an innate ambiguity that presents to the included participant in the enveloping dynamic (i.e. see Poincaré's 'The Relativity of Space') as in the above example of the 'earth turns' and that we, the included observer, 'conveniently resolve for the benefit of our own intellectual modeling' by imposing particular geometries over the top of it (Euclidian, non-Euclidian etc.). relativity is thus, for Poincaré, an ambiguity that we can never truly resolve because we are included in a dynamic that is bigger than us (and that keeps on going out there in an inner-outer interdependent nesting fashion) and more, than this, the enveloping dynamic is continuously transformed by our actions (our actions relative to it), thus we could never come to know it completely except by disappearing into it (by being kinetically undifferentiable from it; i.e. being in 'total resonance' with it).
thus 'inclusionality' that we have been working on corresponds to the 'relativity of Poincaré' and points to the value of the 'relativistic navigational faculty' wherein we collaborate in our relative movements with enveloping others so as to cultivate and sustain community-constituent-codynamical resonance. we base this on 'convenience' with respect to our experienced needs (e.g. it is convenient to the geese to co-create, by means of flocking together, the 'V' shaped outer-inner dynamical resonance). it is convenient from an energy management point of view (increasing, through harmonious collaboration, space-ranging-and-translocational-agility (relative space-time phase management) at finding new inputs of energy for less output of energy).
In other words, this 'innate ambiguity' aspect of relativity, as perceived by the included observer, is an inducement to collaboration that inductively pulls forth and shapes the asserting dynamical structures (e.g. the hexagonal cells of bees are induced by the energy conservation inducements of the collective dynamic---sharing walls of the initially duplicated spherical cells for the larva and since the same material is used for wax or food, doubling the food-producing capacity while halving the construction project costs).
Meanwhile the relativity of einstein is seen as a property of the objective world and thus it has no power to induce collaboration; i.e. einstein's relativity theory 'explains how things work' while poincare's relativity theory provides the basis for 'the inductive pull of evolution' as well as how things work.
to poincare, the fact that a theory is validated does not mean that it is describing reality in full, simply that it is providing a convenient and useful description of reality as determined by the subjective need of the person using the theory.
In fact, the theory represents a 'correction of our experience' in that the theory is more perfect and absolute than is our experience. That is;
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SCIENCE AND HYPOTHESIS. According to Poincaré, although scientific theories originate from experience, they are neither verifiable nor falsifiable by means of the experience alone. For example, look at the problem of finding a mathematical law that describes a given series of observations. In this case, representative points are plotted in a graph, and then a simple curve is interpolated. The curve chosen will depend both on the experience which determines the representative points and on the desired smoothness of the curve even though the smoother the curve the more that some points will miss the curve. Therefore, the interpolated curve -- and thus the tentative law -- is not a direct generalization of the experience, for it 'corrects' the experience. The discrepancy between observed and calculated values is thus not regarded as a falsification of the law, but as a correction that the law imposes on our observations. In this sense, there is always a necessary difference between facts and theories, and therefore a scientific theory is not directly falsifiable by the experience. http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/p/poincare.htm
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Where all of this leaves us is with a choice of embracing, along with Einstein and mainstream science, a purely objective scientific theory that is more perfect and absolute than our own inclusional experience and that imposes its own correction over top of our experience (makes a puppet of us), ... or embracing, along with poincare, our own subjective experience and relegating scientific theory to the role of a language game that we can use as a 'convenient guide' for what is going on around us.
This is the essence of the difference between philosophical 'conventionalism' (embracing one's subjective intuition and using the latest objective reality version as a support tool), and 'realism' (embracing the latest objective world concept as 'the way it is'); i.e.;
CONVENTIONALISM AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF GEOMETRY. The discovery of non-Euclidean geometries upset the commonly accepted Kantian viewpoint that the true structure of space can be known apriori. To understand Poincaré's point of view on the foundation of geometry, it helps to remember that, during his research on functions defined by differential equations, he actually used non-Euclidean geometry. He found that several geometric properties are easily provable by means of Lobachevsky geometry, while their proof is not straightforward in Euclidean geometry. Also, Poincaré knew Beltrami's research on Lobachevsky's geometry. Beltrami (Italian mathematician, 1835-1899) proved the consistency of Lobachevsky geometry with respect to Euclidean geometry, by means of a translation of every term of Lobachevsky geometry into a term of Euclidean geometry. The translation is carefully chosen so that every axiom of non-Euclidean geometry is translated into a theorem of Euclidean geometry. Beltrami's translation and Poincaré's study of functions led Poincaré to assert that
• Non-Euclidean geometries have the same logical and mathematical legitimacy as Euclidean geometry.
• All geometric systems are equivalent and thus no system of axioms may claim that it is the true geometry.
• Axioms of geometry are neither synthetic a priori judgments nor analytic ones; they are conventions or 'disguised' definitions.
According to Poincaré, all geometric systems deal with the same properties of space, although each of them employs its own language, whose syntax is defined by the set of axioms. In other words, geometries differ in their language, but they are concerned with the same reality, for a geometry can be translated into another geometry. There is only one criterion according to which we can select a geometry, namely a criterion of economy and simplicity. This is the very reason why we commonly use Euclidean geometry it is the simplest. However, with respect to a specific problem, non-Euclidean geometry may give us the result with less effort. In 1915, Albert Einstein found it more convenient, the conventionalist would say, to develop his theory of general relativity using non-Euclidean rather than Euclidean geometry. Poincaré's realist opponent would disagree and say that Einstein discovered space to be non-Euclidean.
Poincaré's treatment of geometry is applicable also to the general analysis of scientific theories. Every scientific theory has its own language, which is chosen by convention . However, in spite of this freedom, the agreement or disagreement between predictions and facts is not conventional but is substantial and objective. Science has an objective validity. It is not due to chance or to freedom of choice that scientific predictions are often accurate.
These considerations clarify Poincaré's conventionalism. There is an objective criterion, independent of the scientist's will, according to which it is possible to judge the soundness of the scientific theory, namely the accuracy of its predictions. Thus the principles of science are not set by an arbitrary convention. In so far as scientific predictions are true, science gives us objective, although incomplete, knowledge. The freedom of a scientist takes place in the choice of language, axioms, and the facts that deserve attention.
However, according to Poincaré, every scientific law can be analyzed into two parts, namely a principle , that is a conventional truth, and an empirical law . The following example is due to Poincaré. The law Celestial bodies obey Newton's law of gravitation The law consists of two elements
Gravitation follows Newton law.
Gravitation is the only force that acts on celestial bodies.
We can regard the first statement as a principle, as a convention; thus it becomes the definition of gravitation. But then the second statement is an empirical law.
Poincaré's attitude towards conventionalism is illustrated by the following statement, which concluded his analysis on classical mechanics in Science and Hypothesis Are the laws of acceleration and composition of forces nothing but arbitrary conventions? Conventions, yes; arbitrary, no; they would seem arbitrary if we forgot the experiences which guided the founders of science to their adoption and which are, although imperfect, sufficient to justify them. Sometimes it is useful to turn our attention to the experimental origin of these conventions.
http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/p/poincare.htm [N.B. emphasis in bold typeface is mine]
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