Science and Santa Claus

December 8, 1996

The Genii in Nature; or Deities or Daemons in Nature, as they were interchangeably called, were a consistent feature of the reality packages of ancient times. Heraclitus put them into a self-consistent pre-scientific context in 500 BC, by describing them in terms of a consistent "coherency" or "Logos", a natural "order" which guided the unfolding of all things.

The Genii in Nature are now being restored through the "hidden order" and "self-organizing" concepts of the nonlinear sciences. But this is not without much conflict and disagreement amongst differing scientific and cultural camps, since this restoration has a profound impact on our religious and cultural perspectives.

This note provides a hypothesis on why the "deities" or "self-organizing powers" were banished from nature over the past 2500 years, what new insights are opening the door to their return, and how our collective consciousness influences this restoration.

Ancient Communications

1. Prior to 500 BC, "mythopoeic thought" provided the basic "mode of speculation" used to model reality [1]. This was the ancient tradition of myth and poetic expression. The primary means of communication on reality issues was through the "oral traditions". An additional communications medium was the early pictographic languages, such as Egyptian hieroglyphics, and their many other local variants, which conveyed meaning through the creative interference of groupings of high level glyphs, representing objects, experiences and culturally significant events.

The pictographic languages, as they were built for conveying mythic and poetic thought, were inherently ambiguous. In addition, there were many different variants and the learning of each involved significant overheads in absorbing the often complex meaning in hundreds of basic symbols and combinatory patterns, along with the spoken base They were thus a weak medium for commercial transactions, and the demands of inter-regional trade led to the ascendance of more discrete and standard language forms (e.g. The Phoenician 22 letter alphabet-based phonetic language in c. 1000 BC, and the subsequent 26 letter Greek phonetic language in c. 750 BC.). The phonetic languages continued to grow in popularity, and by the end of the reign of Darius I, the deathknell of the most well developed of the pictographic languages, Egyptian hieroglyphics, had been sounded.

As McLuhan has said, "the medium is the message", and the commercially driven swap-out of a transaction-oriented language for its mythopoeic predecessor, appears to have played both "player and coach" roles in the major philosophic shift in this epoch. The deities in nature, whose history and myth had been preserved and propagated in the symbols and glyphs of the written language, were thus removed from this medium with an efficiency and finality that would take the breath away from political revisionists, used to such primitive tactics as the relabelling of St. Peterburg as Leningrad.

Religious Transition

2. Around 500 BC, the emergent Hebrew belief extracted God from nature and made Him transcendent (i.e. God, as the creator of nature, was now above it). This was the beginning of a radical break with the past views of ancient people, as is alluded to by Frankfort et al [1], who pointed out that; "... the fundamental assumptions that the individual is part of society, that society is imbedded in nature, and that nature is but the manifestation of the divine." ... and that ... "This doctrine was, in fact, universally accepted by the people of the ancient world with the single exception of the Hebrews.

The concept of a transcendent God and a subordinate nature which became the basic tenet of Western religious belief, by implication, banished the deities in nature. Not only did nature lose its divine status (it was henceforth only a reflection of God's greatness), but the investing of God's will through man, subordinated (non-human) nature to the will of man, and alienated man from nature in the process.

The hierarchy of God, man, nature, the basic beliefs of the emergent western religions, opened the door to the concept of "ownership" of man over nature, congruent with the development of a materialist base for society, as was developed in the feudal system.

As for the "deities in nature", they were now demoted to a third tier position beneath two levels of superior beings.

Existential Philosophy Transition

3. Around 500 BC, in parallel with the religious changes occurring in the mediterranean region, Heraclitus and Parmenides came up with two self-consistent pre-scientific reality-modelling approaches. Heraclitus proposed a model which preserved the essential but woolly concepts of the mythopoeic mode, in a highly consistent formulation which overlays, with an amazing level of agreement, today's "wave interference" view in quantum physics. Parmenides opted for a model which isolated "things" from the "order" and "change" in the world, and his view provided the base for Aristotelian logic. Both of these models were remarkable beginnings to a more self-consistent, scientific way of thinking. Where Heraclitus' philosophy implicitly retained the dipolar (complex, or; real + latent) dual aspect of nature, Parmenides philosophy implicitly opted for a "real" only aspect.

In the words of Henri Frankfort et al [1]; "Heraclitus had declared "being" a perpetual "becoming" and had correlated the two concepts with his "hidden attunement" [analogous to Bohm's "implicate order" or the "hidden order" of nonlinear science]. Now Parmenides declared the two to be mutually exclusive, and only "being" to be real."

Today, one can look back and see that Heraclitus was arguing for the wave-interference view of nature while Parmenides was arguing for the material-causal only view. Parmenides idea was picked up and stated in the terms of syllogistic logic by Aristotle. This came to be the "linear", "bottom-up", "Cartesian", "reductionist" etc. way of looking at the world which has dominated Western culture since that time.

The important difference between these two reality-modelling methods is that Heraclitus' model "packaged" the "becoming" (i.e. self-organization) with "being". Thus, his impressively self-consistent conceptual framework left the "deities" in nature. On the other hand, Parmenides, by splitting up "being" and "becoming", split apart "things" and the forces which changed them. Things of nature could therefore no longer be the domicile of gods.

Religio-Philosophical Synergies

4. There was a natural synergy between the concepts of a transcendent God and the logic of Parmenides. Parmenides logic was "absolute" which was consistent with the religious "absolute" of the Old Testament. In addition, the transcendent God had given man a special role, in the execution of God's will on earth. Man was now free to formulate philosophical models which honored this new heavy-duty role.

In the twentieth century, both Poincare and Wittgenstein have observed that the logical Aristotelian model is simply a mental abstraction which acts as a descriptive "grid" or netting to describe nature; i.e. it is not to be confused with an explanation of nature itself. As such, it represented just one of many models which could be used, and Poincare has argued that since nature is so inherently complex due to interconnections between everything, that it appeared unlikely that a single model would ever suffice. David Bohm has suggested, that whatever model is used, it must address higher dimensional order in nature which goes well beyond Aristotelian logic and material-causal transactions.

Between the Greek philosophers and the emergent western religions, there was a powerful synergy which de-deified nature, stripping it of its inherent powers of self-organization, and delivering these to a transcendant God. Both of these modelling approaches were based on "absolute" tenets. That is, they were not subject to validation by human sensibilities but were beyond them. As Poincare, Wittgenstein and others of a scientific predisposition have argued, models which do not assure a consistency between their own abstract inferences and information which is being delivered by one's sensibilities, are prone to breakdown.

One might say that there is a continuous battle going on inside of our heads, as the Gods of nature try to reclaim their lost status from the transcendant God,

"Keeping the Faith"

5. As the Christian church strengthened, it took care to protect the faith against any regressions to the older mythopoeic beliefs. The strong synergies between the Church, the materialist philosophy of Parmenides/Aristotle and the commercial sector emerged clearly in the response to heresies. A case in point is the Catharien heresy in the Pyrenean region of France in the 1167 - 1329 AD timeframe. The Cathars (or Albigensians), while seeing themselves as followers of Christ, rejected the materialism and much of the "transcendent" doctrine of the Church. They believed that there was an inherent and powerful "evil" in the material world. Their philosophy and how it influenced their mode of living is well documented in the book "Montaillou" by Emmanuel le Roy Ladurie.

The Cathars or Albigensians rejected the transcendent powers of God vested in man and the Pope, refused to pay tithes, believed more in "stewardship" than "ownership" of land and were thus a threat both to the Church and the French Royalty which depended on the feudal system. Furthermore, the Cathars were outspoken about their beliefs, as the following incident captured by Jacques Fournier, Bishop of Pamiers [2] and later Pope Benedict XII in Avignon indicates. The comments of Raymond L'Aire, a heretic from the village of Montaillou who publicly asserted his belief that Mary was made pregnant by Joseph, that he did not believe in Christ's crucifixion, resurrection and ascension, nor holy eucharist were captured and placed in the record by Fournier. The Vatican documents record L'Aire as having described the mortality of Mary, Joseph and Jesus as follows; "through fucking and shitting, rocking back and forth and fucking, in other words through the coitus of a man and woman, just like all the rest of us."

Through an allliance of the Church and the French Royalty, the Cathars were systematically eliminated over a hundred and sixty year campaign involving many battles, sieges and mass burnings-at-the-stake.

Philosophies which were in conflict with the tenets of the Church coming from science, were continuously suppressed, lending false credence to the competency of the Parmenidian/Aristotelian underpinnings of the culture. Galileo's punishment by the Church in 1633 caused Descartes to destroy his non-Aristotelian work, "Le Monde" and instead produce the philosophically conformant "Discours..." several years later. Descartes introduces his "methode", based on just four strict precepts of logic, by saying that "a multiplicity of laws often furnishes excuses for evil-doings", and "A state is much better ruled when, having but very few laws, these are most strictly observed;". This is a very different pitch than would have accompanied his "Le Monde", had the burning of all copies of Galileo's works in Rome not prompted him to abandon his non-Aristotelian thinking.

Thus, the opportunity to return to the concept of gods (Daemons or Deities) in nature has been greatly constrained, over the 2500 years, by the surrounding culture.

Signs of Imminent Collapse

6. In spite of many problems with the logico-philosophical underpinnings of western culture, it is only in very recent history, where we see public expression of the breakdown of the rational base established by Parmenides/Aristotle, and built upon by Descartes and Newton. Poincare, at the turn of the century, showed that Newtonian logic was incomplete when applied to more than two bodies, and that nature was inherently unpredictable (i.e. nature could not be fully modelled with absolute logic). In 1921, Wittgenstein's "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" pointed out that logic (mathematics) was merely a tool which was consistent within itself and was "content free". That is, logic said nothing about the phenomena being described, it was simply a netting to give that phenomenon a superficial form so that inferences could be made about it. In 1931, Kurt Goedel formulated a mathematical theorem, "Goedel's Theorem" which proved this point.

In 1971, in his preface to "Objective Knowledge", Karl Popper said; "The essays in this book break with a tradition that can be traced back to Aristotle --- the tradition of the commonsense theory of knowledge. I am a great admirer of common sense which, I assert, is essentially selfcritical. But while I am prepared to uphold to the last the essential truth of "commonsense realism", I regard the "commonsense theory of knowledge" as a subjectivist blunder. This blunder has dominated Western philosophy. I have made an attempt to eradicate it, and to replace it by an objective theory of essentially conjectural knowledge. This may be a bold claim but I do not apologize for it."

As the echoes of Popper's trumpeting fanfare subside to the point that the mind can once again consider content over form, two thoughts arise. The first is that the "smell" of the absolutism of Parmenides and Aristotle lingers on in Popper's words. The second is that Popper sets up a highly simplified approximation to the philosophical problem of "scientific thought", so that he can then "solve" it in spectacular fashion.

Is it "commonsense knowledge" to view all of nature as inanimate matter which responds to causal forces? --- not to the pre-Socratic ancients, not to Heraclitus, not to Eastern philosophers, not to the North American Indians nor the Celts. Perhaps Popper is referring to a specific type of "commonsense knowledge" which is practiced solely by those scientists he is trying to distance himself from. Was it commonsense or simply qualitative abstraction that moved Aristotle to formulate a "causal" law of inertia which came to summarized as "omne quod movetur ad alio movetur" [4] ("whatever is moved must be moved by another"), and that bodies fell to earth with a velocity proportional to their weights --- the easily disproved by Galileo in the 17th century.

Perhaps Popper's ideas on "Objective Knowledge" are not such a grand departure from tradition, simply another variant on the theme of "qualitative abstraction" --- an opening of the door to a mechanical process for refining hypotheses, which yet ignores the "logos" of Heraclitus, the "bundling" of "being and becoming" which allows nature to be self-determining.

Basically, Popper argued that statements cannot be proven absolutely true, but can be conclusively falsified; statements not subject to falsification in principle are not scientific. The first part of Popper's proposition was essentially a corollary of the findings of Poincare, Wittgenstein and Goedel. Thus the "absoluteness" incorporated in the 2500 year old Parmenides/Aristotle model is rapidly coming apart at the seams as we traverse the twentieth century. The Parmenidian pillar of absolute "thingness" still appears present in Popperian "objective knowledge", however.

Popper has taken a swipe at history for its "subjectivist blunder", but is not nearly so acknowledging of the role of culture as is, for example Kuhn ("The Copernican Revolution", "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" etc.). Galileo suffered the threat of death, in 1633, for his tradition-breaking conjectures, and Descartes destroyed his non-Aristotelian work "Le Monde" prior to its publication, on hearing of Galileo's plight. Shortly before, in 1620, Kepler was defending his mother from a charge of witchcraft, which was not particularly helped by Kepler's scientific and science fiction writings. The baggage of Parmedian/Aristotelian "de-mystification" of nature was in a particularly festering state at that time, making things very dodgy for both Kepler (who charges had also been drafted for) and his mother. Bernstein [3] notes that; "In Weil-der-Stadt, Kepler's idyllic birthplace, with a population of 200 families, 38 witches were burnt between 1615 and 1629. In the neighboring Leonberg, where Kepler's mother now lived, a place equally small, six witches were burnt in the winter of 1615 alone, according to Koestler."

If culture were not such a powerful suppressor of non-traditional thinking, Popper's break with tradition might have emerged a thousand or more years earlier. It would appear that the ratio of personal status in the culture, to the severity of the break with tradition, must be above some threshold level for both conoclast and iconoclasm to survive intact. In addition, it appears that our Parmenidian/Aristotelian culture greatly devalues the "bootstrapping" or "interference" oriented explanations of nature, and greatly admires "material causal" laws. Thus Kepler's geometric and harmonic laws (dealing with orbital geometry and periodicity) were not fully appreciated until Newton "gave a physical explanation for them", as most references say. In fact, Newton did no such thing; to the chagrin of Leibnitz, Berkeley and others, he invented the mathematical concept of a "force field" and other mathematical tools to provide a mechanical-causal abstract model for gravity and motion which was culturally appealing.

What Newton left behind in his "physical explanations" was the genius of nature. This fact was bemoaned by David Bohm, who notes that Newton's true insight on gravity, was one of geometric harmony and order; "as with the order of motion of an apple in fall, so with that of the moon and so with all". This is nowhere to be seen in his material-causal formulation F =g*m1*m2/d**2. There seems little doubt that Newton was following in the footsteps of Descartes and "playing" to the culture of the time, but perhaps for different reasons (ego, rather than fear). Eaton notes that [4]; "But M. Descartes", remarks Bossuet, "was always afraid of coming under the notice of the Church, and we see him taking precautions in this matter which go to excess." He had before him the fate of the philosophers of the preceding century who had ventured to question the accepted physical doctrines. Ramus, Bruno, Campanella, Vanini, had suffered for their opinions, and Descartes did not propose to join their company."

Kepler, who made the blatantly Heraclitean statement in his "Harmony of the World"; "Geometry existed before the Creation, is co-eternal with the mind of God, IS GOD HIMSELF", narrowly escaped being burnt at the stake. But harmony is not where the Western world "is at" since the Parmenidian-Aristotelian "conspiracy", apart from North American Indians (see "From Helio-centric to Helio-Eccentric" on this web page). Instead, the western culture values and puts their rational dollars on mechanical-causal Aristotelian formulations which are lifeless atonal, and most often, discordant. Where such shortfalls have become scientifically apparent (Poincare's three body problem, deterministic chaos, and nonlinear dynamics in general), they has largely been ignored.

This brings us up the current state of the debate, for not everyone agrees that the Popperian model is the "final word". Stephen Jay Gould makes some insightful comments in the Foreward to "The Strange Case of the Spotted Mice", a 1996 publication of some of Peter Medawar's prior essays (Medawar was a Nobel Prize winning Biologist); "... Medawar was an uncritical disciple of Sir Karl Popper, and his arguments hew strictly to the Popperian doctrine of falsificationism ...". Meanwhile, Gould observes; "I find Popperianism narrow in some ways, outdated in others, and in this sense cannot agree with all of Medawar's methodology."

Thus, we have a current view of the debate over which reality modelling approach or approaches are "best". But how can "best" be defined? Poincare suggested that the essential quality measure is the fit between our sensibilities and the mental model. Psychologists such as R. D. Laing have reinforced this view by pointing out that what is going badly awry in our society is a consequence of the fact that our current shared (cultural) model of reality alienates us from nature and does not mesh with what our sensibilities are telling us.

This is not to say that we should confine our sensibilities to studying one system at a time. As it has been frequently pointed out, our senses when focused on our local surroundings suggest to us that the earth does not move. However, when we "bootstrap" by letting our senses reconcile the inter-relationship between many different systems (a process that depends on involuntary, "implicit" memory), a new and more powerful form of "commonsense" emerges. It was probably this type of "bootstrapping" commonsense that led Copernicus to his helio-centric formulation, for as Bernstein [3] suggests, Copernicus was building on inaccurate data and had he been possession of accurate data, they would not have meshed with the concept of circular orbits and; "... he might have abandoned the heliocentric system then and there." More likely, Copernicus was in the error-resilient "bootstrapping" thought mode, and the discovery of inconsistencies may have seen him revise his orbital geometry, as Kepler was forced to do given the more precise astronomical data furnished by Tycho Brahe.

The subjugation of nature by logic over the past 2500 years, through the force fitting of a succession of Aristotelian mechanical framework variants appears to have about run its course. This anthropocentric schizophrenia, which subordinates our background consciousness to the foreground rationality process which it itself spawns, has left a tremendous legacy of damage and destruction and promises to be increasingly more difficult to live with as we move into the future. The investment of energies and resources into the logical opportunity-driven development of technology has lacked the guidance of any conscious overview (top-down view) of its own implications. This "inert" view of nature (Parmenides) in the face of the apparent natural order and self-determining power of nature (Heraclitus) appears close to bankruptcy. The "gods in nature", a mythopoeic expression of natural forces, are screaming out for their reinstatement.

Logic Versus Reality

7. Overall, the data suggests that we are still stuck on the point that Poincare and WIttgenstein were trying to make, that our rational models are not models of nature, but are abstractions which allow us to see the form of, and make inferences on nature. As Popper conjectured, our models can never be complete explainors of nature, thus they can never be "proven true". While the religious and mythological approaches offered no opportunities for falsification, neither was there an opportunity for falsification in the basic tenets of Parmenides' and Aristotle's philosophy. Popper added, in his definition of science, this need for a hypothesis to be exposed to falsification, opening the door to a continuous learning and refinement of hypotheses, albeit still mechanically-oriented.

What appears to have been left out, however, is the notion that what is being falsified is not a theory of nature, but an abstract netting which is used to infer things about nature. This distinction is important, because it says that while we may be able to falsify the netting conclusively, we cannot "fully" falsify a holistic or mythopoeic model of reality any more than we can establish its absolute truth. If we are given a mythical model, we must first extract an approximation which can pass for a "logical" model, in order to be able to "conclusively" falsify it. If the "myth" is, that the earth goes around the sun, to consclusively falsify this, we need to formulate this myth more precisely. If we choose circular orbits, we will falsify it, if we choose elliptical orbits, we will not falsify it. This suggests that myth (and "bootstrapping") which may be off in the detail of its logical formulation, may nevertheless possess substantial value. If we were so motivated, we might use the mythical model in closing in on the rational model "from the outside", rather than eschewing it and its proponents.

Making the Problem Fit the Solution

8. The flaw in thinking which appears to be pervasive in today's reality modelling can be examined via the concept of "The Art of the Soluble", as advanced by Medawar and embraced by many, if not most, scientifically-minded people. For example, Sir Hermann Bondi, in the 1988 Oxford publication "Let Newton Be", quotes Medawar in the following context; "In the philosophy of science I am very much a follower of Karl Popper, and of his notion of the need for scientists to create theories and to subject them to empirical testing. Another follower of Popper, Peter Medawar, particularly stressed what is implicit in Popper's work, that 'it is strictly necessary for scientists actually to do something'. To talk about an insoluble problem, even to talk very intelligently about an insoluble problem, is scarcely a recognized contribution to science. In a splendid little book Peter Medawar gave science the title 'The art of the soluble', seeing it as the test of a scientist to attack problems on which some impression can be made, rather than to waste time on insoluble tasks.

It is the 'selection' of these problems that a good deal of the nature of good scientific work, and indeed scientific genius, lies. I like to say that, if you talk about the problems that you meet when you walk about the street, 80 percent of them are insoluble, while 19.5 percent of them are trivial. It is the task of the scientist to select the tiny layer between the insoluble and the trivial, where skill, insight, originality, creativity, and application can make a difference. The difficulty of finding this layer is often overlooked. It is often not appreciated that an enormous amount of skill and experience and the sheer 'nose' of particularly the older and more experienced members of the profession goes into finding such a layer."

If one has ever wondered how explorations into the nonlinear, the essential workings of nature, could have lain fallow for all these centuries and persist in being ignored by today's science, Bondi has given us a very insightful accounting.

Here we have the gist of the separating arguments, for Wittgenstein and many others believe that a system, to be fully understood, should be approached from the nonsense side as well as from the "inside". Thus the mystics and loose thinkers may well shed valuable light on complex problems in spite of the fact that their models may be mixtures of fact and fictional interpretation. Bondi and Medawar are pitted against this type of impure modelling approach (Medawar is often venomous in his attacks on "mystics masquerading as scientists"), and advocate building knowledge bottom-up, putting the next piece of the jigsaw puzzle cleanly and securely into place.

The Bondi-Medawar view is essentially a "reductionist" or "bottom-up" view as opposed to a "systems" or "top-down" view. According to a growing number of scientifically minded people today, the hope for a deeper and more unified view of nature associates with a top-down "systems" or "bootstrapping" approach. This process looks at the consistencies in the web of interrelating dynamics between subsystems. It is a search for the "Logos" or "hidden attunement", as Heraclitus might say.

Bootstrapping can be seen as analogous to holography in that the resolving power and resilience to error, builds as the web of interference reconciliations is extended. That bootstrapping is possible, opens the door to a different way of thinking about reality modelling and exposes contradictions and limitations in the views of Medawar and similar thinkers. Ian Stewart says it best in his book "Does God Play Dice?: The Mathematics of Chaos". He points out that an approximate solution to an actual problem is not the same as an exact solution to an approximate problem. (Medawar and Bondi are advocates of solving 'approximate problems'). Stewart points out that the process of setting up an "approximate problem" can be fraught with dishonesty.

"The more honest approach is to state, and prove, a theorem that explains in just what sense this exact solution to an approximate problem can be viewed as an approximate solution to the exact problem. (No, Virginia, they are NOT the same thing; in mathematics there is no Santa Claus.)"[p. 76]

Perhaps the reason that many scientists, such as Medawar, react so violently to mythical and undisciplined thinking, is because the best defense is often a good offense. That is, science has by mutual agreement maintained a "Santa Claus" which allows one, with scientific impunity, to find solutions to approximate problems of one's choosing, a privilege which many would not like to see disappear. Thus, the entire industry of neo-classical economics can proceed even after being shown to be pursuing solutions to an irrelevant approximation to the problem. And in the field of I/T, technology-befuddled business managers are everyday sold high-tech "solutions" to approximate problems which have little relevance to "real" business problems, a situation which has given rise to the term "productivity paradox".

That is, science has indeed had a Santa Claus to validate the finding of solutions to "solvable approximations" to problems without every having to explain "in just what sense this exact solution to an approximate problem can be viewed as an approximate solution to the exact problem." It is precisely this "Santa Claus" gap in rational thinking, that has allowed Aristotelian logic to dominate our culture for the past 2400 years, having us believe that the world and all that's in it is lifeless machinery.


In conclusion, Popper and Medawar may be right in stating that hypotheses can and should be conclusively falsified within the scientific process. But what is still implicit in the propositions of Popper and Medawar is a mechanical, ratcheting up of the quality of our scientific hypotheses. If nature inherently involves the "harmonic attunement" of polar opposites, as Heraclitus and a number of modern physicists are suggesting, the Popperian approach seems somehow "incomplete", lacking reference to it.

The modern physics concept of "bootstrapping" is about finding consistent harmonies across natural systems, in the manner of Kepler, and the mythopoeic tradition. So what merit is there in attacking the people and the ideas who approach reality modelling from the "non sense" side of the system, building from mystical or astrological harmonies? Is it not the boundary between sense and non-sense which defines the system from both within and beyond itself that we are looking for, as Wittgenstein maintained? Chasing the layer between the insoluble and the trivial seems manifestly opportunity- driven. There is perhaps a historical precedent for this, as it was the commercial material-transaction drive which clinched the win for syllogistic logic in the 500 BC timeframe, and which continues to have us implement "solutions" on the basis of whether or not there is economic market for them, however uninformed on systemic implications that market may be. Commerce has followed science in assuming that "things will work themselves out" if problems are attacked bottom-up in a mechanical, unconscious Parmenidian fashion --- didn't Descartes and Newton say it was so?

Popper has made a first order correction to this historical reality-modelling problem by his "falsificationism", but this in itself does not impact the opportunistic economic drive orientation in commercial and social problem-solving. Problem-solving investments applied bottom-up, in lieu of "the more honest approach" suggested by Stewart, which would force a reconciliation with "hidden attunement" issues, are likely to continue to exacerbate the conflict and alienation between man and nature. It is not rational to expect any "deus ex machina" to sort this one out for us ... we are going to have to come to grips with the fact that in nature, as in mathematics, "there is no Santa Claus", only powerful forces which the ancients respectfully and quite rightly "deified" in myth and poetry.

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[1] Frankfort, Frankfort, Wilson, Jocobsen and Irwin, "The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man", The University of Chicago Press, 1946

[2] Duvernay, Jean, Jacques, "Le Registre d'Inquisition de Jacques Fournier, eveque de Pamiers (1318-1325), Toulouse, 1965 3 Volumes.

[3] Bernstein, Jeremy, "Experiencing Science", 1978

[4] Eaton, Ralph, M., "Descartes Selections", Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927