SOS – Science or Superstition?  en français  auf deutsch



The following  is a list of common ‘superstitions’ in the form of idealized ‘objectified’ entities whose existence is contradicted by experiential evidence.  Since a common definition of ‘superstition’ is “a notion maintained despite evidence to the contrary” (Webster’), much of our western ‘scientific thought’ falls into this category, creating the conditions for ‘incoherence’ and ‘dysfunction’.  The physical reality of the existence of objectified entities, as contrasted with spatial-relationships tends to be taken for granted in our western culture, but ‘objectification’ is an idealizing that we superimpose on our experiencing of nature that has ‘escaped’ (bypassed) validating scrutiny [1]  in pre-relativity, pre-quantum-theory scientific models such as mainstream scientific thinking and the thinking, in general, of the educated western public.  (A more detailed elaboration is appended following the list of ‘superstitions’).  Undulative features’ in the common living space dynamic belong to the common living space and having our science synthetically objectify them may create ‘object-i-fiction’ models for science, but will have no authority over the dynamics of nature.


Since the objectification of our experiencing of nature has bypassed scientific validation, it can be seen as an over-simplified ‘object-i-fiction’ and our persistence in maintaining these object-i-fictions [idealizations that depend upon absolute material bodies in absolute containing space (Euclidian space)] in spite of evidence to the contrary amounts to ‘superstition’


The following superstitions or ‘object-i-fictions’ arise in the manner of Ptolemaic epicycles, to keep our traditional oversimplified idealization-based scientific models ‘hanging together’;


Superstitions and Object-i-fictions in our Scientific Worldview;





The existence of the temporal past: This cornerstone object-i-fiction of mainstream scientific thinking contradicts evidence that our world transforms in the continuing ‘present’.   We are meanwhile, in the western way of thinking, so accustomed to objectifying the past and the future that we tend to confuse them (idealizations) with the reality of our natural experiencing of the ongoing transforming space we are included in.  We allow ourselves to be disproportionately influenced by one of our senses, ‘vision’, which gives us the sense of a temporal sequence of realities recorded in picture-frames.  When we re-examine these ‘snapshots’, whether in our minds-eye or through photography, we tend to think of the ‘party’ or the ‘school days’ in terms of actions that had a beginning and an ending; i.e. as ‘events’ or epochs that occur in a temporal sequence.   Our living experience, however, is continuous-in-the-present and it deepens, extends, enriches and the latter experiences seem to include the former rather than being experienced as a ‘new epoch’; i.e. each new experience enriches and deepens the former experience, something which doesn’t show up in the visual record.  We cannot capture our experience in a photograph, we can only capture ‘what we are presently doing’.  This particular ‘superstition’, belief in the existence of the past, arrives from our ‘self-centeredness’ or ‘ego’; i.e. if we consider ourselves included in the evolving worldspace then there exists no past, but if we consider ourselves to be absolute entities, then we can use our own life-cycle as a time-scale with a beginning (our birth) and an ending (our death) and ‘timestamp the world’ based on our notion of absolute existing.  


Photographs and visual imagery can be snapshotted one after the other in sequence but our felt experience is not like our vision.  And as Wittgenstein said of language (word images) it is ‘single issue at a time’.   The atmosphere is continuously transforming; i.e. it is a space that evolves in the continuing present yet features within it, such as the hurricane, ‘catch our eye’ and while they are only an undulation within a continuously evolving space, we ascribe to them a continuing existence of their own and it is this ‘existence’ (‘objecthood’) that we endow these features with that give us the sense that they have temporal duration; a past, present and a future and therefore that there must be a past, present and future that they live in.   But ‘objecthood’, the existence of discrete things is an idealization that is contradicted by our experience; i.e. objecthood is simply bestowed by us on emergent forms in the transforming spacetime continuum.   Without ‘objects’, there is no ‘persistence of objects’ which gives us the sense of ‘temporal duration’ which gives us the sense of past, present and future; i.e. without objects everything is spatial-relational transformation in the continuing present.  No one has ever found an ‘object’ that exists in its own right independent of the spatial-relational transformation (evolutionary dynamic) everything is included in, therefore there is nothing that persists (‘everything is in flux’ as Heraclitus said).  And if no ‘thing’ persists, then there is nothing with a past, present and future; i.e. the existence of the past is pure ‘idealization’ tied to ‘object-i-fiction’ and is contradicted by our natural experience.


The existence of inner purpose : This idealized source of guidance of human behaviour plays a role like that of an epicycle in Ptolemy’s earth-centric model of the universe, to make an over-simplified model ‘hang together’.  The oversimplified model in this case is the Euclidian model wherein idealized-as-absolutely-existing discrete material objects ‘populate’ an idealized-as-absolutely existing containing space, … a framework which leaves no room to explain dynamics other than in terms of the behaviour of material bodies which, in the case of the material body known as a ‘human’ demands that the source of the human’s behaviour must derive from the internals of the human (in this way, decoupling the behavioural sourcing of the individual from the influence of the space he is included in).  In relativity, the superstition of ‘inner purpose’ as the driver of individual behaviour gives way to ‘spatial-relationship’.


If this sounds crazy and you are thinking; ‘It is obvious I have inner purpose’, consider what you are assuming by ‘I’.  If you are to the worldspace you are included in, like the hurricane is to the atmospheric space it is included in, then everything about you is ‘relative’ even though this relativity allows you to be unique (due to your unique situational inclusion in space).   If your behaviour is relative to the space you are included in, then there is no need to postulate ‘inner purpose’ as the source of guidance for one’s behaviour, one is then like the sailboat in a windy space, shaping and letting oneself be shaped by the windy space to both power and steer oneself. 


The existence of individual memory:  As we navigate busy freeways, crowd dynamics and social dynamics, we put our movements in the service of sustaining harmonious flow in the shared space that we are included in.  This is a situation wherein we move under one another’s simultaneous mutual influence and it is not solvable in terms of ‘what an individual does’ (the mathematical ‘three-body problem’).   Thus we cannot have a memory of it in terms of ‘what we did’, but we can, collectively, ‘get better at it’, and this implies a kind of memory which is suggested by “the structure of the organization is a record of the embodied know-how’ (complex systems).  ‘Learning organizations such as ‘hockey teams’ and ‘rugby teams’ (and honey bee cell-building teams) etc. evolve their collective technique on the basis of sustaining spatial-relational resonance/harmony, but this cannot be reduced to ‘what things do’ and/or ‘memories’ of what I did or ‘what things do’.  It is understood in terms of how one complements the developing geometry of space one is included in, so as to sustain harmony etc.  This kind of ‘know-how’ is embodied (remembered) in the evolving collective dynamic itself; i.e. it is remembered in the evolutionary dynamic.   The individual taps into this by putting one’s actions in the service of sustaining a harmonious flow-dynamic; i.e. by ‘giving oneself up to the collective evolutionary dynamic one taps into the developing memory embodied in the spatial relationships.


The notion of ‘memory’ as a personal archive of stored knowledge that informs the ‘inner purpose’ so as to calculate behaviour in a SIDA cycle manner (sense, interpret-decide-act) is not REALLY memory, in terms of the memory of experience, it is instead a reductionist codification of ‘what things do’.  We could use artificial intelligence to collect and archive such knowledge and build a robot with ‘inner purpose’ in the form of a computer program that calculates behaviour, based on it, … but it is not ‘memory’ in the sense of the ‘memory of experience’ which is NOT individual in nature.  In the same sense as one cannot capture ‘hitting’ out of the context of ‘fielding’, since these are mutually shaping, … one cannot have an individual memory of an innately two-sided (individual asserting-spatial accommodating) experience.  A memory is like a word; “it is absolutely impossible for one person, but becomes a reality for two.  The word is direct expression of the historical nature of human consciousness.” --- Vygotsky


Meanwhile, the notion of ‘individual memory’ is demanded by the Euclidian model which portrays physical dynamics as a temporal causal construction perpetrated by asserting material agents.  The causal model assumes that the immediate future is constructed from the immediate past [2] thus there is no room for ‘recessive’ nonlocal memories from the remote past to permeate the construction of the future from the immediate past, except by idealizing an archive of knowledge accessible to the individual.  ‘Genes’ and ‘individual memory’ supply an epicycle-like ‘patch’ to the causal model whose simplicity leaves out the capacity to account for the nonlocal and remote past (evolutionary past) from influencing the ongoing developments in the continuing present (where the future is constructed from the immediate past); i.e. relativity with its spacetime that evolves in the continuing present ‘has no past’ and therefore no individual memory of ‘the past’.  The past and the future are built into the present.   Rationality demonstrates human individual’s capacity for fantasising, however, as is demonstrated by the ‘replicants’ in the film ‘Bladerunner’ who have been individually ‘programmed’ with made-up pseudo-memories of being brought up en famille and come to mistake the deliberately infused ‘memories’ for their evolutionary past. 


Every time we come down the onramp and enter a busy traffic flow, we ‘improve’ our ability to ‘slip in  harmoniously’.  Of course it is not really ‘our personal ability’ but instead that property of dynamical collectives known as ‘resilience’ (fault-tolerance) which subsumes potentials for dissonance prior to their actualization.  This is the capacity of a collective that give their own behaviours up to the sustaining of harmony.  Would we then say that we ‘remember our first and subsequent experiences of entering the traffic flow via the onramp?  Such experiences are innately relational and ongoing.  Déjà vu is not the equivalent of ‘déjà senti’ (already felt) since ‘already felt’ can apply to our inclusional experiencing in the evolving space of the continuing present.  That is, what we saw previously is ‘in the past’ because ‘things no longer look like that now’ but ‘what we felt previously is part of our continuing life experience within the evolving space-time continuum.  The visual perception context of ‘déjà vu’ is temporal sequential as in the frames in a movie film while the sentient experiencing of  ‘déjà senti’ is inclusionally nested as in the geologic layering of the earth (experientially, it is old and young at the same time).    


The existence of nation/national dynamics:   Nations do not exist in nature but only as idealizations in our mind (legal/political concepts whose existence depends on common accord).  The Soviet Union existed pre-1991 and in that era we spoke of ‘what the Soviet Union did’, but the Soviet Union only exists as an ideal, a notional closed space bounded by imaginary lines, not as an physical entity capable of behaviour in the natural sense of behaviour.  Post – 1991 the Soviet Union no longer existed and people no longer talk about it as doing things.   It stopped existing when people stopped believing in it (when it stopped believing in itself) since it was only an idealization in the first place.  To say that a nation is responsible for certain actions and accomplishments is superstition, the same sort of superstition as saying ‘hurricane katrina’ or ‘el niño’ was responsible for destruction rather than spatial turbulence in a common transforming space which cannot be broken down into a temporal sequence of causal effects perpetrated by particular assertive agents.  National dynamics are undulations in our world dynamics that have become ‘objectified’ (given a ‘local center’ along with an ‘internal purpose’.) but which are nevertheless innately relative.


History (e.g. of a nation, thing, organism): As in the case of ‘nation’, the existence of any ‘thing’ which we say is the ‘cause’ of certain results is a superstition. The natural history of the world (the evolutionary dynamic which is spatial-relational) is one thing but the history of a nation is quite another since ‘nation’ is an idealization rather than ‘real’ and thus to speak of the ‘action of a nation’ and to speak of ‘the history of the nation’ in terms of an ‘idealized entity’ as being the author of action, is superstition.


There is certainly ‘evolutionary history’ and ‘evolutionary time’ in the case of a transforming space wherein ‘everything is in flux’ but there is no way to mix and max the idealized notion of a ‘nation’ with the world evolutionary dynamic and credit the ‘nation’ or ‘thing’, or ‘organism’ with a ‘history’.   It is self-deceiving superstition.   We can speak about the history of the world in terms of all of the nation-idealisms which we created which lasted as long as we agreed to believe in them, but once we start speaking about ‘how it developed’ we may as well be talking about a small rectangular area on a developing embryo and what its locally centered history is; i.e. the history of a notional subdivision within a transforming space makes no sense ‘in reality’ since it ignores the system’s inextricable inclusion within a global suprasystem.


The problem in this case and in general is that we cannot truly break ‘objects’ (a ‘nation’, a ‘thing’, an ‘organism’) out of the flow and describe their historical development as if it were ‘theirs’.  However a notional ‘object-entity’ develops is mutually shaped by the accommodating quality of the hostspace it is included in.  To describe its development as if in-its-own-right (as in ‘the history of a nation’) is like writing a resumé since it is an account of ‘hitting’ out of the context of ‘fielding’.          


Microbes as the ‘cause’ of ‘illness’: Pathogen-causation theory in general (e.g. ‘terrorism’) is made problematic by what Donald Rubin (Harvard Medical School) calls ‘the fundamental dilemma of causality’; i.e. if X causes Y to go to Y’, how do we know that it was X that caused it and not something else since now that Y has been moved to condition Y’ the experiment cannot be repeated to see if P might have caused Y to alter to Y’.   For example if the patient is given an antibiotic to ‘cure’ his illness and the patient recovers, we say that the antibiotic caused his recovery.  But he might have recovered without the anti-biotic yet we can never know whether or not another X’ (the chicken soup, the caring nurse) might not have driven Y to Y’ since we cannot return the patient to his virgin condition Y to check it out.   This is particularly problematic if the patient dies.  The way we ‘get around this’ is to say that all people are more or less the same, so we shift causality to a statistical basis (unlike eastern medicine where everything orients restoring balance in the individual).   But we know that the conditions in the host space of the individual human body can vary, not only with the makeup of the particular person, but also with the ambient conditions (hot/cold, humid/dry etc.) which can stress the dynamic equilibrium sustaining body processes leaving new and particular exposures.   As Nobel laureate in biochemistry Albert Szent-Gyorgi observed; we say that a person’s death was ‘caused by pneumonia’, but the person would likely never have come down with pneumonia without having caught a cold and might never have caught that cold without having let his vitamin C level drop to a low level.  Meanwhile over 100 different bacteria and viruses have been identified as causing pneumonia.


Clearly, the evidence points to Stephen Jay Gould’s premise (which is essentially ‘relativity’) that ‘there can be no assessment of ‘hitting’ out of the context of ‘fielding’, meaning that the source of ‘illness’ equates to ‘destabilization’ or ‘unbalancing’ rather than to pathogenic cause.  The over-riding influence of ‘sensitive dependence on initial conditions’ [3] (Chaos Theory) also points to ‘resilience’ (ability to sustain spatial-relational resonance/harmony) and ‘disequilibrium’ (inability to sustain spatial-relational resonance/harmony) to underly ‘health’ and ‘illness’ rather than the over-simple ‘all internal parts working correctly’ for ‘health’ and ‘some internal parts damaged by the attack of pathogens’ for ‘illness’.).


Criminals as the ‘cause’ of ‘crime’: The causal reasoning here suffers from the same difficulty as the pathogen-causation theory that deals with microbes.  Our real-life experience informs us that the dynamics of collectives have a spatial-relational resilience, whether we are talking about traffic flow or heated discussion at the dinner table.  We say that X causes injury to Y, taking Y to the condition Y’ (death, missing an eye etc.) but we know that under alternative conditions, the same X might not have ‘caused’ the injury to Y due to different ‘fielding’ conditions; e.g. Y might have ‘backed off’, P and Q might have seized X before he could do the damage, X might never have been ‘cornered by the crowd’or ‘humiliated’ etc. in such a way that he was put on a collision course with Y.   Resilience on the part of a traffic/crowd flow collective can be highly developed, inducing sustained spatial-relational resonances that subsume the actualizing of conflict potentials prior to their actualization. 


Our experience provides plenty of evidence to show that ‘cultivating resilience’ is not the simple opposite of ‘eliminating cause’.  Svent Gyorgi’s point was that cultivating the resilience of the body hostspace dynamic by sustaining the level of trace chemicals such as ascorbic acid subsumed the potentials for destabilization prior to their actualization (e.g. more than one hundred microbes can be responsible for pneumonia in a body hostspace prone to destabilization, and similarly, many individuals in a tense crowd situation can be at their ‘breaking point’ with respect to their potentials for violence.  In both cases it is possible to lower the tensions so that the threshold for destabilizing conflict is subsumed prior to its actualization.  This lowering of the tensions is not through assertive actions but in knowing how to back off so as to spatially accommodate and subsume the tensions/conflict-potentials prior to their actualization..).


If motion is ‘relative’ then we cannot realistically split apart ‘hitting’ and ‘fielding’ (assertive action and spatial accommodation).   In a community hostspace we have a collection of individuals who move relative to one another (i.e. as in the solar system they move under one another’s simultaneous mutual influence).  In this ‘relative motion’ view, we cannot speak of an ‘individual source of causation’, only in terms of the emergent conflict within the collective hostspace dynamic (e.g. the ‘flow-dynamic’ in traffic which is spatial-relational in nature).  In order to speak of an individual source of causation, we must invoke the notion of ‘absolute motion’ of the individual, and with this, the notions of an absolute self-center, absolute material existence and the idealization of ‘inner-purpose’ (individual ‘intent’ out of context of the spatial relationships in which the individual is included, which in turn invokes the notion of ‘individual memory’).


Pathogen-causation theory, then, is dependently underpinned by ‘superstition’, by idealized concepts that are contradicted by evidence coming from our real-life experience, and thus scientific thinking which upholds pathogen-causation theory is not ‘science’ but ‘superstition’.


Biogenetic/internal cause of individual ‘mental illness’): The incidence of what we call ‘mental illness’ is on the rise, having increased from one per thousand of population in 1750 to five per thousand in the present, in spite of massive interventions with drugs.  E. Fuller Torrey (The Invisible Plague) claims that ‘insanity is a disease’ that is likely CAUSED by a virus that we have not yet isolated and he cites William Farr as follows;


“Such a disease, which disorders the senses, perverts the reason and breaks up the passions in wild confusion; which assails man in his essential nature --- brings down so much misery on the head of its victims, and is productive of so much social evil --- deserves investigation on its own merits, by statistical as well as other methods.” ---William Farr, Report upon the Mortality of Lunatics, 1841


Others maintain that ‘mental illness’ has biogenetic and biochemical origins, … more theory which puts the ‘cause’ of ‘mental illness’ in the interior of an idealized center-based, independently existing entity.


Meanwhile, the notion that ‘mental illness’ is a disease has been strongly contested and evidence shows that it is more like ‘cracks’ in the resilient structure of our society; i.e. it is owned by the social hostspace dynamic rather than by the individual (i.e. it is ‘relational’ in origin rather than being sourced from within the internal biochemistry and biogenetics of the individual).


For example, the incidence of schizophrenia amongst blacks in England is five times the incidence rate of whites and five times the incidence rate of blacks who reside in predominantly black communities (hostspaces).  This is evidence in support of the spatial-relational origins of ‘mental illness’ which parallels the evidence supporting the spatial-relational origins of criminality and medical illness cited in the above ‘superstitions’.   Evidence further shows that those who recovery from psychosis through ‘group therapy’ (an empathic local social hostspace) and are deemed ‘better’ and thus ready to return to society, often find that THEIR problem recurs in the stressful social space of the community at large.   The evidence once again points to the fact that ‘hitting’ (going crazy) and ‘fielding’ (craziness inducing hostspace) are two aspects of a dynamical one-ness that cannot in reality be ‘split apart’, as the principle of relativity suggests.


E. Fuller Torrey’s efforts to apply ‘pathogen-causation’ theory to ‘mental illness’ would, as in criminality and illness, OCCLUDE any DIRECT role for the quality of the hostspace in the sourcing of the instability.   That is, the pathogen-causation theory incorporates a machine-like idealization of the dynamics wherein the ‘environment’ only plays an indirect role which puts the individual in opposition to the environment and thus there may be greater incidence of ‘breakdown’ in individuals in a ‘difficult environment’, the idealization that ‘breakdown’ within the individual is responsible for ‘the ‘malfunctioning’ or ‘abnormality’  is nevertheless retained.  The pathogen-causation theory divides the population into two categories of individual (those that break down and those that do not break down) and assesses ‘hitting’ separately and out of the context of ‘fielding’ as in the idealization of ‘the sound of one hand clapping’.


In nature, we could not say that the storm ‘gets angrier’ and becomes a ‘hurricane’ and then sets off on a destructive rampage; i.e. that would be an idealization that personified the undulation in the fluid fabric of the atmosphere as an ‘independent entity’ whose behaviour pushes forth from its own center of self driven by its ‘inner purpose’.  We could not say this since the evidence from our experience is that the hurricane is nonlocal in origin and its center is not ‘ITS’ center but is ‘inference’ that originates in space-based flow-dynamics, and of course the need for the notion of ‘inner purpose’ dissolves with the acceptance of the relative and therefore nonlocal nature of the phenomenon.   This geometric representational alternative is always available and arises from the principle of relativity of motion.


We cannot say, realistically, that ‘the earth rotates’ since the origins of the earth’s motion are nonlocal and its centricity as well is nonlocally inferred.  It is by our own ‘prejudice’ [1] that we impose ‘object-hood’ on features that belong to the supraspace they are included in and thenceforth idealize their behaviour as springing forth from the center of themselves driven by some inner purpose.


This object-i-fiction flies in the face of evidence to the contrary derived from our real-life sensory experience (it is our visual perception where the shortfall lies that encourages us to believe that ‘the earth rotates’ but our sensing as an included inertial element within a gravitational field informs us of our inclusion within a hostspace dynamic that also includes the earth and thus the rotation of the earth has origins which are more extensive and nonlocal than the ‘centeredness’ suggested by our visual perception  which sees ‘the earth rotating’).


Thus by this same unnatural subordination of our inertia-guided relational sense of inclusion in the field-flow of gravity, to our visual perception which suggests that ‘things move’ in their own independent right, we sustain the ‘superstition’ that ‘mental illness’ is something that arises within the individual in the manner that ‘rotating’ is something that arises in the earth; ergo ‘the earth rotates’ and ‘the individual is mentally ill’.


Evolution of the organism:  The problem of breaking the organism out of the world dynamic and ascribing ‘behaviour’ to it in the context of such behaviour pushing out of its center guided by its ‘inner purpose’ is the same as is the case with the nation; i.e. it is an idealization that is contradicted by the evidence of our natural experience.  Just as the nation is simply our idealization that comes and goes according to our subjective belief in its existence, so it is with the ‘organism’ and so it is with all ‘independent objects’ that we subjectively ‘extract’ from the spatial dynamic in which they are included and credit them, as Gould says, with the capacity to ‘hit’ out of the context of the spatial quality of ‘fielding’ whose accommodating receptiveness or resistiveness amplifies, attenuates and otherwise shapes the actualization of assertive ‘hitting’ potentials, and out of the context of which one cannot realistically talk in terms of the ‘hitting’ or assertive aspect of dynamics that actualizes.


We are deceived by our visual perception which picks up on ‘schaumkommen’ as schroedinger refers to matter and its dynamics, mere ‘appearances’ of undulations in the fabric of space, and makes them over into ‘persisting things’ (things that ‘exist’).  Since we objectify these undulations in space called ‘material entities’, equip them with a center of their own and an inner purpose to drive their now-independent behaviour, … we are then ‘reconstructing realty’ from an artificial base upon which we now build more superstitions such as ‘organisms evolve’ when there is plenty of evidence to the contrary; i.e, that ‘space evolves’ and that the undulations in the flow-stuff of space interdependently CO-EVOLVE.   As has been discussed above, the idealisms of ‘individual memory’ and ‘genes’ have been formulated so as to make our over-simplified reductionist representations of natural phenomena ‘hang together’; i.e. the evolution of the organism is another ‘superstition’ that is being treated as a ‘scientific truth’.



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The above list of ‘superstitions’ (thus labelled in accordance with webster’s dictionary which defines superstition as “a notion maintained despite evidence to the contrary” ) are all currently accepted as ‘scientific truths’ which persist in spite of increasing evidence to the contrary, and thus qualify as ‘superstitions’.


The rigid and absolutist idealizations of science such as pathogen-causation and ‘organisms evolving’ are evidently and manifestly ‘superstitions’.




Discussion on the source of superstition in science;


According to modern physics, there is no absolute distinction between a material object and the space (energy field) it is included in; i.e. material objects are local (complexly configured) concentrations of energy within a common energy field (the gravitational field).  A moving object is therefore equivalent to the relative movement, within the field, of the concentrated energy configuration and since the energy field (otherwise known as ‘space’) is a dynamical unity, ‘motion’, which we have been used thinking of as ‘something produced by material objects’, now becomes ‘transformation of space’ in terms of relative spatial relationships.


Incorporating this ‘relativity’ in our deliberate (rational) mental modeling of the world requires that we ‘pull back’ from any ‘hard dependency’ on the visual notion of discrete ‘things that exist’ and from thinking of dynamics in terms of ‘what things do’.   In the place of ‘local things’ (closed form objects with centers) capable of ‘their own behaviour’, we have a-centric and non-locally inferred flow-forms with the geometry of whorls within fluid flow, as with hurricanes in the atmospheric space-flow.   In the evolutionary dynamics of space, in place of ‘cause-and-effect’ with its notion of ‘outcomes’ that can be attributed to the assertive actions/transactions/interactions of discrete bodies, we have the ‘relative’ situation wherein the actualizing development of the asserting flow-form and the accommodating ‘give’ of space are conceived of as two different dynamics invented in the observer’s mind (idealizations) for his intellectualizing convenience rather than being ‘real’ (as in the case of the hurricane with atmospheric space, the ‘real’ dynamic involved is transformation of the fluid-dynamical space and it is only for the convenience of discussing this transformation that we impose ‘objecthood’ on the hurricane and sythentically endow it with ‘its own center’ and ‘its own assertive behaviour.   This idealized objectification gets us into trouble in our description of evolutionary dynamics in the manner described by Stephen Jay Gould in ‘Full House’ where, as he puts it, we cannot credit responsibility for ‘hitting results’ to the batter in baseball, without at the same time taking into the account the ‘fielding’ (the receptive or resistive accommodating of the space he is included in).  In our relative reality, ‘hitting’ and ‘fielding’ (individual asserting and the accommodating ‘give’ of space) are really one dynamic (spatial transformation) which we as observers split into two for our own mental modeling convenience.


That is, from the new ‘field’ perspective, ‘material entities’ can be seen as ‘idealized’ objects; … abstractions which we psychologically impose on our mental models of reality but which are not imposed on nature. Henri Poincaré spends considerable time on making this point his three core works on the ‘philosophy of science; Science and Hypothesis, The Value of Science and Science and Method.  This ‘idealism’ (‘objectification’) leads us to construct a pseudo-reality based on ‘what things do’ wherein we attribute causal responsibility to material objects for emergent developments within an absolute pseudo-reality, the familiar scientific pseudo-phenomenon we refer to by ‘causality’ and ‘determinism’.


Poincaré speaks to this issue in terms of a shortfall in our visual perception relative to our somatic sensory experience (spatial awareness).   For example, from a position in space (e.g. in a nearby orbit such as if we were on the moon, the earth VISUALLY appears to ‘turn’ (to ‘rotate on its axis’) but to say that ‘the earth rotates’ is to attribute such movement to the earth itself when we know that if our scientific inquiry ‘drills down’ (analytically, reductively) into whatever is included in our field-of-view, we will never find the answer to the ‘movement of the earth’ since it is relative to the collective dynamic (solar system hostspace or ‘fieldflow’ dynamic) that we (the observer) are also included in.    To attribute the earth’s rotation ‘to the earth’ would require imposing the assumption that space is absolute; i.e. that ‘the earth is turning and space is staying still’ which we know is an absolute form of idealization that goes beyond validation by our experiencing of nature.  (N.B. While our visual sensing induces us to attribute to the earth itself the behaviour of ‘rotating’, our somatic faculty of spatial-relational balance wherein we sense our movement relative gravitational field space imposes no such idealized local centralization of behavioural sourcing; i.e. our somatic awareness of being situated within a field dynamic does not ignore that fact that both we, the observer, and the targets of our observing are included within a spatial-relational dynamic.)


As Poincaré remarks, while this imposing of idealized ‘objects’ that exist and move independently of space, and this absolute space that exists independently of objects, provides a reference framing that makes the movement of objects appear to be ‘absolute’ (makes object behaviour appear to be ‘independent’), this imposed absolute space is very unlike the space of our experience, and is in fact the most simple geometric idealization of space that we can come up with [4]..


Scientific thinking has been pervasively based on the pseudo-reality constructed from the behaviour of idealized absolute (independent) material objects and idealized absolute space, even though the evidence is abundant that this idealized reality does not reconcile with the reality of our natural experience.   Since ‘superstition’ is “a notion maintained despite evidence to the contrary” and since there is plenty of evidence that contradicts the notion of reality in terms of idealized absolute (independent) objects that populate an idealized absolute space, the implication is that our scientific world view, … at least our scientific worldview based on discrete material entities,… is superstition.


Rather than discrete material entities being the basis of dynamical behaviour in nature, THE EVIDENCE INSTEAD points to these entities  being ‘undulations in the fabric of space’ and thus not separate from space itself but features within a space that is transforming in the continuing present (a ‘spacetime continuum’); e.g;


[It was proposed that matter substance, mass and charge, did not exist but were properties of the wave structure.  Wyle, Schroedinger, Clifford, and Einstein were among those who believed that particles were a wave structure.  Their belief was consistent with quantum theory, since the mathematics of quantum theory does not depend on the existence of particle substance or charge substance.  In short, they proposed that quantum waves are real and mass/charge were mere appearances; 'Schaumkommen' in the words of Schroedinger.  The reality of quantum waves, as suggested by Cramer (1986), supports the original concept of W. K. Clifford (1876) that all matter is simply "undulations in the fabric of space."]


Since modern physics presents us with evidence of the proposition that ‘space’ or ‘field’ is more fundamental than matter and relativity suggests that we must think of space in the non-euclidian geometry terms of a space-time continuum, the attribution of ‘life’ and ‘consciousness’ to individual material objects such as human beings is problematic, or in fact, by the above definition, ‘superstition’.  That is, the objectification of ‘waves structures’ or field ‘flow-forms’ is an idealization of the same type as is the objectification of flow-forms such as ‘hurricanes’ in the field-flow atmospheric space.   While these flow-forms appear VISUALLY TO THE OBSERVER to have behaviours that are sourced from their ‘centers’, … it is a misnomer to say ‘THEIR’ center since such centers are nonlocally inferred in the manner of ‘undulatory features’ within a continuous undulating space rather than ‘existing’ in-their-own-right in an absolute sense.


Just as ‘epicycles’ were introduced into the earth-centric Ptolemaic model of the heavens to ‘make it hang together’, we are forced to invent similar ‘fixes’ to keep our idealized absolute Euclidian space and ‘locally-centered’ object mental model ‘hanging together’.


For example, if a human object is idealized as ‘independent’ then we come up with the idealization that its behaviour issues forth from ‘its center’ driven by its own notional ‘inner purpose’.   These idealizations, that individual human behaviours issue forth from ‘the center’, shaped by ‘inner purpose’ are merely ‘what is needed’ (intellectual contrivances) to explain movement in non-relative (absolute, idealized) terms of being ‘independent entity based’.


But nobody knows where ‘the inner purpose’ is located, for example, or where, exactly, is ‘the center of a person’ (a ‘center’ is the property of a geometric object so that we must first ‘geometrically objectify’ natural flow-forms, an idealization that is equivalent to, as John Stuart Mill says, ‘decreeing’ the independence of the entity).


Furthermore, once we start constructing pseudo-realities from a foundation of absolutely existing things in absolute space, we are dependent upon the notion of absolute time since ‘absolute time’ and ‘absolute spatial location’ co-define ‘motion’ in terms of the trajectory of spatial displacement of the center of the material entity.   And once we are dependent on ‘time’ and ‘entities’ this leads to the notion of the ‘beginning of existence’ of an entity and the ‘end of existence’ of an entity.


We don’t have this ‘existence’ problem in the case of continuing flow; i.e. in the case of atmospheric space flow-dynamics, they are ongoing and the ‘hurricane’ is an emergent ‘form’ within the flow.  In other words, it is ‘an undulation in the fabric of atmospheric space’ that ‘catches our eye’ and ITS so-called ‘existence’ is determined by when we, the observer, begin to notice it, and impose a name on it etc. and likewise its cessation of existence comes when we can no longer ‘see it’; i.e. when this undulation in the fabric of space quietens down to the point that we can only see the space it was included in, as if its asserting energy was absorbed by the space it was included in.   The reality and existence of what we call ‘material bodies’ then, is purely subjective ‘schaumkommen’ (‘appearances’).   The evidence supports our accepting, as the primary reality, the continuously undulating field-space which is characterized by spatial-relational (evolutionary) emergence and re-absorption of purely relative undulatory flow-forms.  We needn’t have, as Poincaré notes, ‘named’ the transient feature and by doing so non-relatively (absolutely) ‘declared ITS existence, ITS center, ITS behaviour since it is a nonlocally inferred a-centric transient form in the flow analogous to the hurricane in the atmosphere that happens to ‘catch our eye’; i.e. it is ‘space’ that owns its own undulatory features and their behaviours and we cannot, except by superstition, since all evidence is to the contrary, transfer this ownership to the features themselves and make them out to be ‘independent’.


 * * *


[1] “So [since the problem of certainty in identity such as A=A is handled, in Euclidian geometry, by invoking he notion of invariable solids] “objects” are implicitly assumed to be invariable bodies. Therefore the axioms of geometry already contain an irreducible assumption which does not follow from the axioms themselves. Axiomatic systems provide us with “faulty definitions” of objects, definitions that are grounded not in formal logic but in a hypothesis — a “prejudice” as Hans-Georg Gadamer might say — that is prior to logic. As a corollary, our logic of identity cannot be said to be necessary and universally valid. “Such axioms,” says Poincaré, “would be utterly meaningless to a being living

in a world in which there are only fluids.”  --- Vladimir Tasic,


[2] "First, with respect to time [the first foundational approximation of classical mathematical physics]. Instead of embracing in its entirety the progressive development of a phenomenon, we simply try to connect each moment with the one immediately preceding. We admit that the present state of the world only depends on the immediate past, without being directly influenced, so to speak, by the recollection of a more distant past. Thanks to this postulate, instead of studying directly the whole succession of phenomena, we may confine ourselves to writing down its differential equation ; for the laws of Kepler, we substitute the laws of Newton." --- Henri Poincaré, Science and Hypothesis

[3] "A very small cause which escapes our notice determines a considerable effect that we cannot fail to see, and then we say that the effect is due to chance. If we knew exactly the laws of nature and the situation of the universe at the initial moment, we could predict exactly the situation of that same universe at a succeeding moment. but even if it were the case that the natural laws had no longer any secret for us, we could still only know the initial situation approximately. If that enabled us to predict the succeeding situation with the same approximation, that is all we require, and we should say that the phenomenon had been predicted, that it is governed by laws. But it is not always so; it may happen that small differences in the initial conditions produce very great ones in the final phenomena. A small error in the former will produce an enormous error in the latter. Prediction becomes impossible, and we have the fortuitous phenomenon."  --- Henri Poincaré, Science and Method

[4] "One geometry cannot be more true than another; it can only be more convenient. Now, Euclidian geometry is, and will remain, the most convenient: 1st, because it is the simplest, and it not so only because of our mental habits or because of the kind of direct intuition that we have of Euclidian space; it is the simplest in itself, just as a polynomial of the first degree is simpler than a polylnomial of the second degree; 2nd, because it sufficiently agrees with the properties of natural solids, those bodies which we can compare and measure by means of our senses." ... "For here the mind may affirm because it lays down its own laws; but let us clearly understand that while these laws are imposed on 'our' science, which otherwise could not exist, they are not imposed on Nature."  --- Henri Poincaré, Science and Hypothesis



Main Entry: su·per·sti·tion
Pronunciation: "sü-p&r-'sti-sh&n
Function: noun
Etymology: Middle English supersticion, from Middle French, from Latin superstition-, superstitio, from superstit-, superstes standing over (as witness or survivor), from super- + stare to stand -- more at STAND
1 a : a belief or practice resulting from ignorance, fear of the unknown, trust in magic or chance, or a false conception of causation b : an irrational abject attitude of mind toward the supernatural, nature, or God resulting from superstition
2 : a notion maintained despite evidence to the contrary